In detail
1. An allowed list of connectors
Employees cannot install any MCP server they find on the internet. There is an approved list, and if a connector is not on it, the agent refuses to run it. Getting on the list means a security review first, even for the ones Block builds itself.
2. Identity-based authentication
No more hand-managed API keys and tokens. Block wired the agent into its identity provider, so authenticating into a tool works like the OAuth flow employees already use for Workday. Browser pops up, biometric, done. The protocol supports this directly: the MCP authorization specification is built on OAuth 2.1, so a remote MCP server can rely on the company’s existing sign-in instead of shared secrets.
3. Flags on destructive actions
Tools get annotated for what they can do. Anything that can change, edit, or delete is marked destructive, and the agent is set to ask permission before running one. Non-destructive actions flow; destructive ones stop for a human. MCP has fields for this: a tool can declare hints such as readOnlyHint and destructiveHint. The schema calls them hints, not guarantees of how a tool behaves, and the tools section says clients must treat them as untrusted unless they come from a trusted server. That’s one more reason the allowed list in step 1 comes first.
4. A human in the loop
For the risky steps, a person stays in the decision. The agent surfaces what it wants to do and why, and a human says yes or no. The point is not blanket caution. The human stays on the few actions that actually carry risk.
Why it matters
Most companies are still running pilot programs, and the worry is exactly this: 12,000 people moving fast with AI and something sensitive leaking. Block’s answer is not to lock it down, it is to make the safe path the default one.
Practice the approval decision
Try a fictional agent patch review: the agent changes both the code and a test, and you can inspect two pieces of evidence before choosing a limited release or a hold. The exercise asks what a human needs to check before authorizing deployment. The incident and its outcomes are authored fiction from Chain of Thought.
Hear it from the guest
“And so if it's not on that allowed list, you cannot use like it will not work. The agent will say nope. Can't install it.”
“Agent, you're allowed to run any tools that are not destructive. But if you run into one, that is, you need to ask my permission first.”
“Actually deploying agents in the enterprise autonomously on private data in private networks has kind of stalled out because it's sort of horrifying.”
Quotes lightly edited to remove filler words.
From the conversation
This explainer is drawn from these episodes — each carries its full transcript.
Concepts in this explainer
Canary DeploymentPrompt InjectionSandboxingShadow DeploymentModel Context Protocol (MCP)AI AgentHuman in the LoopTokenization